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i. INTRODUCTION
The high strength and low weight characteristics of carbon fiber com-
posite materials make them extremely attractive for the fabrication of
aircraft structural components. A potential hazard has been identified,
however, due to the possible releaserof fibers resulting from an
aviation accident which involves fire and/or explosion. Following such a
release, the fibers may propagate downwind for considerable distances.
The electrically conductive nature of these fibers presents a potential
hazard to electrical devices which may be encountered and which is enhanced by
the tendency of the fibers to align with strong electric fields. NASA
has been engaged in a comprehensive risk analysis program directed at the
hazards associated with potential widespread use of such materials in
commercial aviation.
One of the possible hazards is the potential for significant electric
power outages due to fiber interactions with electric power systems. Such
outages are most likely to be associated with medium voltage distribution
networks, since the very high voltages associated with long distance power
transmission are likely to burn away the carbon fibers without adverse
effects. This report addresses the power system problem in some detail
and develops risk estimates based on the release and dissemination proper-
ties of carbon fibers and the structural properties of electrical distri-
bution systems. The estimates are conservative but are independent of
detailed network properties which may vary from location to location. Such
conservative estimates bound the risk presented to power distributio_ and
since the estimated risks are negligible in comparison to normal outage rates,
more detailed analysis and system-specific calculations are not warranted.
The principal sources of data used in this analysis are experimental
insulator failure studies performed by Westinghouse, Inc., discussions
with the Transmission and Distribution Division of Boston Edison, Inc.,
and estimates detailed in .the Arthur D. Little, Inc., Phase I and Phase II
reports to NASA.
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2. ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
2.1 BACKGROUND
An electric power distribution system is the portion of an electric
power system which provides the connection between consumers and a bulk
power source such as a transmission line termination. Its functions are
to provide reliable service to consumers and to perform the required volt-
age reduction from the higher voltage levels used for long-distance trans-
mission. Historically, individual systems have evolved in response to
changing electric power demands. There are, consequently, signiificant
variations among utilities with regard to specific design practices. Even
within a particular utility network, there may be variations in circuit
design to accommodate the load requirements of a specific area. However,
since all utilities seek the common objectives of minimum voltage varia-
tions, minimum service interruptions, reasonable cost, and flexibility to
adapt to future power demand, certain general design practices have emerged
which characterize a large fraction of existing power distribution circuits.
This chapter discusses these practices and presents a specific distribution
system in order to provide the details required in the analysis of the
potential for carbon fiber induced power outages. The emphasis is on the
_N_ntification of _eneral properties characteristic of distribution sys-
tems rather than details of any specific system. In this way, the risk
estimate furnishes a meaningful indication of the overall risk to electric
power distribution.
2.2 GENERAL DESIGN CONFIGURATION OF DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
In general, an electric power distribution system can be divided into
five components; subtransmission circuits, distribution substations, pri-
mary feeders, secondary circuits and consumer service connections. Figure
2.1 is a schematic representation of a typical power distribution system
and indicates each of these components.
The bulk power source is typically a high-voltage (115 kV or greater)
transmission line providing the connection to distant power generation
facilities. Subtransmission circuits are commonly operated at approximately
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FIGURE 2.1. TYPICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM SHOWING
COMPONENT PARTS.
69 kV and deliver power to the distribution substations. These circuits
may be single lines as shown on the left side of Figure 2.1, or may be
multiple connections as illustrated on the right. The latter configuration
is employed where higher reliability is required. It should be noted,
however, that the increase in reliability may be reduced with respect to
carbon fiber hazard since the lines would often occupy the same right of
way and, therefore, may be subject to similar exposure levels.
At the distribution substation, the voltage is further reduced to
the level selected for general distribution throughout the load area.
Although there is significant variation in the selected voltage, most
utilities use voltages in the 4 to 33 kV range. The substation consists
of one or more transformer banks, switching equipment, and voltage regu-
lation equipment. For purposes of this analysis, the 0nly significant
features are the voltage reduction and the presence of a reclosing circuit
breaker which disconnects the entire load area when a fault is experienced
along a primary feeder.
The primary feeders run from the distribution station through the
approximate geographical center of the load area. Usually, the only fault
protection for these lines is the main breaker at the substation. Thus,
an insulator failure along a primary circuit will cause an outage affecting
the entire load area. At suitable locations, lines branch off from the
primary feeder (generally following side streets) which are protected by
fuses. This helps to improve the system reliability since a fault on one
of these "laterals" will not operate the circuit breaker at the station.
It will, however, produce a localized outage of longer duration since it
is necessary for personnel to replace the blown fuse.
Distribution transformers are located at regular intervals along the
primary feeders and laterals to provide the final reduction of voltage
to the level required for household connections. Typically, a distribution
transformer services approximately ten homes. Finally, the secondary
circuits provide direct connections from the distribution transformers to
the individual consumers.
This type of distribution system is referred to as a radial system
and is by far the most commonly used system in predominantly residential
neighborhoods. Its widespread use is attributable to its simple config-
uration which minimizes the required switchgear and, hence, lowers its
cost. Its principal disadvantage is the relatively high potential for
power interruption due to the lack of redundant circuits. Consequently,
it is used primarily for residential loads whereas alternative distribution
systems would be Used for specific loads (such as industrial operations)
where continuity of service is more critical. The risk analysis, however,
will be based on a radial system both because it is the most commonly used
system and because it provides a conservative estimate of the general
reliability of a distribution system.
2.3 DESCRIPTION OF A SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
With the advice of the transmission and distribution department of
Boston Edison, circuit number 533-H2, serving parts of Bedford and Lexington,
MA, has been selected as a representative suburban distribution system.
This system reflects the design practices currently followed by Boston
Edison and is felt to be representative of many suburban distribution
systems. A suburban system was selected for analysis because it represents
the most vulnerable type of system. This is the case because power dis-
tribution in an urban area is generally underground, and therefore, quite
secure against carbon fiber exposure. Rural systems are also less vul-
nerable because they have wider spacing between poles and hence have fewer
insulators. Additionally, a power failure in the rural area will gener-
ally impact fewer customers than in a populated suburban area. The analy-
sis of a suburban system is, therefore, felt to represent the largest
risk presented to power distribution.
The principal mechanism for power failure due to carbon fiber exposure
is a ground fault due to insulator flashover. Consequently, the most
important system properties for purposes of this analysis are the number
and types of insulators, their spatial distribution and the probable con-
sequences of their failure.
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In general, the consequences of an insulator failure are strongly
dependent on its location within the system. However, the present risk
assessment is directed at distribution in general and not specifically at
Bedford, MA. It is, therefore, desirable to find a conservative approxi-
mation to reduce dependence on specific properties of the Bedford system.
An important observation in this regard is that the distribution network is
composed of a number of "circuits" or groups of insulators protected by a
single device. Such circuits often serve side streets or small neighbor-
hoods and the failure 0f one or more insulators within the circuit implies
a power outage for all customers served by the circuit. Since individual
circuits are spatially localized and since a cloud of carbon fibers
encloses a contiguous set of insulators, the probability of multiple
insulator failures within a single circuit is high in comparison to the
probability of multiple failures within several circuits. Multiple failure
in several circuits, of course, involves a much higher consequence. It
follows, therefore, that an assumption that the exposed insulators are
randomly located within the distribution system is conservative since it
increases the probability of exposing insulators from several different
circuits relative to the probability of exposing them from the same cir-
cuit. Such an assumption is important to assure the general validity of
the risk estimate since it removes from the calculation dependence on the
specific geographic locations of individual circuits, thus making the cal-
culation less sensitive to the arrangement of any particular town. To
perform a risk calculation based on this assumption, it is only necessary
to know the number of protective devices, the fraction of the total insula-
tors associated with each device and the number of customers whose power
is interrupted by activation of the protective device. This information
is summarized in Table 2.2 and is used for the calculations in Chapter 3.
Clearly, an assumption of uniform insulator spacing is conservative
if the highest insulator density observed in the system is used to repre-
sent the entire area. Based on examination of system maps and a visit to
the area, the region of the highest insulator density was located and the
number of insulators per unit area estimated based on the observation that
each pole supports 3 pin type 15 kV porcelain insulators. The result of
this is that the number of insulators per unit area is approximately
1.04 x 10-3 ins/m 2.
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'_ TABLE 2.2
'i
PROPERTIES OF BOSTON EDISON CIRCUIT 533-H2
REQUIRED FOR RISK ESTIMATES
Total number of insulators = 1200
Total number of fuses = ii
i00 2Total area of the Bedford, MA system = .6 sq mi = 1.6 x m
Area of the densest population = 2.87 x 105 m2
Number of poles in the densest area = i00
Number of insulators in the densest area = 300
Number of insulators in the densest area that will
operate the station breaker = 60
Fraction of the insulators in the densest area that
will operate the station breaker = 0.2
Fraction of the insulators in the densest area
that will operate a fuse = 0.8
Average number of insulators per unit area 300 insulators
(assuming highest density) = 2 =
2.87 x 105 m
1.04 x 10 -3 ins/m 2
: , .° :
This examination of the Bedford distribution system has estimated
only macroscopic properties of the system and has ignored detailed pro-
perties such as geometric configuration and fault clearing by the sub-
station breaker. However, the simplifying assumptions which have been
made result in overestimation of the potential for power outages due to
carbon fibers and, as discussed in Chapter 3, still result in negligible
additional risk of power outage.
2.4 OUTAGE HISTORY
In order to provide a basis for assessing the significance of the
estimated outage rates due to carbon fiber exposure, a limited amount of
data regarding the system outage history from normal causes has to be
obtained. This information is summarized in Table 2.3 and will be referred
to in the next chapter. In general, there are at least six
outages per year on this circuit and a total of at least i000 customers
are affected annually.
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_ TABLE 2.3
PARTIAL OUTAGE HISTORY FOR BOSTON EDISON CIRCUIT NUMBER 533-H2
Date Duration (hrs) Number of Customers Affected
4/24/79 0.88 20
6/19/79 1.34 120
7/17/79 3.03 90
7/27/79 0.85 90
1/10/78 1.95 240
1/11/78 0.83 120
3/14/78 2.16 885
6/14/78 1.41 90
7/25/78 1.35 400
8/14/78 1.31 240
8/28/78 2.01 3
- 8/29/78 0.76 240
11/27/78 0.96 2,400
9/12/77 0.93 120
• 10/19/77 1.00 65
11/09/77 1.20 i0
11/27/77 1.01 665
12/06/77 3.75 2,400
12/13/77 0.53 2,400
Source: Private Communication, Boston Edison, Inc.
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3. ESTIMATES OF RISK TO ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
3.1 BACKGROUND
The previous chapter has provided descriptions of power distribution
systems, the spatial distribution of insulators within the system, and
the typical consequences of an insulator failure. To produce estimates of
the risk of power failure, it remains to combine these results with data
regarding insulator failure probabilities and estimates of carbon fiber
exposure levels.
Throughout this analysis, a number of conservative assumptions have
been used to ensure that the resulting estimates will be relatively
independent of specific properties of any particular distribution system.
Some of the key assumptions are summarized below:
• The aircraft crash occurs at or near an airport in the immediate
vicinity of a suburban neighborhood.
• A maximum carbon fiber release occurs and weather conditions
distribute the fiber in a way that causes the highest possible
outage probability (uniform exposure distribution).
• Insulator failures occur at random locations throughout the
system rather than in a particular region (higher probability
of multiple circuit failures, see Section 2.3).
• Insulators are uniformly distributed over the suburban area
at the highest density (number per unit area) observed anywhere
in the system.
These assumptions result in a conservative estimate (i.e., an over-
estimate) of the risk.
i0
z3.2 DISCUSSION OF WESTINGHOUSE DATA ON INSULATOR FAILURE
In order to determine the risks associated with the release of carbon
fibers, Westinghouse has donducted an_experimental program to investigate
the failure probability due to flashover of wet and dry _.5 kV, 15 kV, _9_.I
35.4 kV insulators exp0sedl to _airborne carbon fibers _ _ _:•
: . ,:
These results were based on laboratory tests of seven 7.5 kV pin
insulators and ten 15 kV C neck distribution post insulators. The insu!-
1
ators were exposed to 2 mm carbon fibers at concentrations of 1.5 x 104
fibers/m 3 and 1.6 x 104 fibers/m 3, respectively. Assuming that insulator
failure probability depends only on fiber exposure, the percentage
of insulators failed as a function of exposure was recorded.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the percentage of insulators failed as a
function of carbon fiber exposure level for 7.5 kV and 15 kV insulators
respectively. Since these plots are on Weibull paper and are approximately
linear, we concluded that, over the range of testing, the insulator
failure probabilities are well represented by a two parameter cumulative
Weibull distribution with the parameters as indicated on each plot.
Table 3.1 summarizes these values of the Weibull parameters and the func-
tional form is provided by Equation 3.1.
B
(3.1)
PF(E) = i - e
where :
E = specified carbon fiber exposure level
PF(E) = probability of insulator failure before reaching exposure E
e, B = Weibull parameters (see Table 3.1).
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TABLE 3.i
SUMMARY OF WEIBULL PARAMETERS
INSULAT OR _ B
7.5 kV 0.69 x 108 7.4
15 kV 0.64 x 108 8.2
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The straight lines in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are the plots of this
expression with the specified parameters. The experimental data show
a Weibull behavior for exposure levels as small as 4 x 10 7 fiber-sec/m 3.
For lower exposures, however, the assum_tio n of a Weibull distribution may
overestimate the failure probability. For instance, it may be that, at
lower exposures, the relatively few fibers till burn without any adverse
consequences to the insulator thus preventing any failures below some
threshold exposure. In the absence of specific experimental results for
these lower exposures, we assumed that the insulator failure probabilities
due to carbon fiber exposure can be characterized by a Weibull distri-
bution throughout the range of interest.
For exposures much below 1 x 10 7 fiber-sec/m 3 the insulator failure
probabilities are negligible, generally less than 10-15 . Consequently,
this exposure will be taken as a lower bound in the subsequent calculations.
3.3 ESTIMATED CARBON FIBER EXPOSURE LEVELS
The detailed estimation of carbon fiber exposure contours, in
general, depends not only on the amount of carbon fibers released but
also on the specific atmospheric conditions. Detailed modelling of such
factors is clearly beyond the scope of this study, so it is necessary to
rely on existing results and conservative approximations to obtain
reasonable bounds on the expected risk. The Arthur D. Little Phase I
and II studies on the risks associated with the use of carbon fiber
composites in commercial aviation provide results of numerical
modelling for a limited number of release scenarios. Some of the results
on typical contours are presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 In general,
exposures of 107 or greater occurred infrequently and covered only a small
area_ and were not estimated for these studies.
15
Table 3.2
REPRESENTATIVERESULTSFOR CARBONFIBERRELEASEIN FIRE-EXPLOSIVEMODE
Type Wind Mass Height Nearest point of contour, NEAR,_M): Farthest downwind travel distance, FAR(M);.Maximumwidth, WFSAX,(M);
of Velo Rel of and area within contour, AREA, (M21; for different exposure values.
Atm_ Ci,j eased Source
phere (M/S) (KG) (M) l.OE6 FS/M3 l.OE5 FS/M3 l.OE4 FS/M_ l.OE3 FS/M3
NEAR FAR WMAX AREA NEAR FAR WMAX AREA NEAR " FAR WMAX AREA NEAR FAR WMAX AREA
4 4 50 0 50 I18 50 369 50 I115 50 3098
950 8.34E4 3350 9.58E5 11000 9.59E6 34000 8.26E7
4 4 50 I0 I00 137 I00 455 50 1394 50 3828
1200 1.19E5 4300 " 1.50E6 14100 _ 1.54E7 43100 1.29E8
4 4 50 20 200 124 150 477 150 1494 lO0 4102
_ o 1200 9.77E4 4600 1.67E6 15300 1.78E7 46650 1.50E8
4 4 lO0 0 50 167 50 518 50 1538" 50 4135
c_ 1400 1.77E5 4850 1.95E6 15600 1.88E7 46900 1.52E8
L
4 4 lO0 10 lO0 199 50 642 50 1915 50 5090
1750 2.58E5 6150 3.08E6 20000 3.00E7 59100 2.36E8
_,=
4 4 lO0 20 150 196 150 681 lO0 2052 lO0 5449
1850 2.61E5 6650 3.48E6 21650 3.47E7 63800 2.73E8
4 4 500 ..0 50 369 50 Ill5 50 3098 50 7863
3350 9.58E5 llO00 9.59E6 34000 8.26E7 •95900 5.92E8
4 4 500 I0 I00 455 50 1394 50 3828 _50 9558
4300 1.50E6 14100 .I.54E7 43100 1.29E6 118600 8.90E8
4 4 500 20 150 477 150 1494 I00 4102 I00 10198
4600 1.67E6 15300 1.78E7 46650 1.50E8 127400 1.02E9
Source: A. D. Little, Inc. Phase I Report
Table 3.3
SAMPLERESULTSFROMPLUMERISE AND FIBER DEPOSITIONMODEL
Explanation of Variables:
IATI_: Atmospheric Stability (Pasquill Type) VS: Deposition Velocity of Fibers (M/S) = 0.032
UIO: Wind Speed at Height of I0 Meters (M/S) DOTMF: Fuel Burning Rate (KG/S) = 33.3
HM: Mixing Depth (M) TIMEB: Total Time of Burning (S) : 600
XSTAR: Downwind Distance at which Plume Reaches DIAM: Diameter of the Pool (M) = 60
Max Neight (M) TA: Temperature of Atmosphere (K) = 288
CFKGS: Total KGSof Carbon Fibers Released (KG) TLAPSE: Temperature Lapse Rate in the
NP: Plume Rise Height (M) Atmosphere = 0.03
Nearest point of contour, NEAR, (M); Farthest downwind travel distance, FAR, (M); Maximumwidth, WMAX,(M);
and area within contour, AREA, (M2); for different exposure values.
I.OE6 FS/M3 I.OE5 FS/M3 I.OE4 FS/M3 I.OE3 FS/M3
NEAR FAR WMAX AREA NEAR FAR WMAX AREA NEAR FAR WMAX AREA NEAR FAR WMAX AREA
IATM=4
UIO=4
HM=I500 0 0 0 0 0 0 8300 11048
XSTAR=300 0 0 0 0 0 0 87300 6.86E8
CFKGS=IO0
HP=403 WMAXoccurs at X : 0 WMAXoccurs at X = 0 WMAXoccurs at X = 0 WMAXoccurs at X = 75300
IAII_=4
UIO=4
HM=I500 0 0 0 0 10300 8080 6300 16107
XSTAR=300 0 0 0 0 83300 4.63E8 94300 1.lIE9
CFKGS=500
HP:403 WMAXoccurs at X = 0 WMAXoccurs at X = 0 WMAXoccurs at X = 74300 WMAXoccurs at X = 77300
IATM=6
UIO=2
HM=IIO0 0 0 50150 676 37150 5069 31150 7181
IXSTAR=I50 0 0 52150 1.06E6 58150 8.36E7 61150 1.69EE
ICFKGS=IO0
iHP=508 WMAXoccurs at X : 0 wMAxoccurs at X = 51150 WMAXoccurs at X = 52150 WMAXoccurs at x = 53150
IATM=6
UIO=2
HM=IIO0 0 0 3_150 4247 33150 6608 28150 8363
XSTAR=I50 0 0 57150 6.00E7 60150 1.40E8 63150 2.30EE
CFKGS=500
HP=508 WMAXoccurs at X = 0 WMAXoccurs at X = 53150 WMAXoccurs at X = 52150 WMAXoccurs at X = 53150m
SOURCE: Arthur D. Little, Inc., Phase I Report
As pointed out in the previous section, however, insulator failure
probabilities due to carbon fibers are negligible for exposures of
106 fiber-sec/m 3 or less. It was necessary, therefore, to develop an
approximation of the contour areas for the higher but less probable
exposure levels.
Since a power outage occurs whenever at least one insulator fails, a
conservative estimate of outage probability will be obtained by choosing
a fiber exposure distribution which maximizes the probability of ob-
serving at least one insulator failure. This requires evaluation of the
combined effects of the variation in failure probability with exposure level
and the variation in the area of the exposure contours. Under the as-
sumption of uniform insulator spacing and Weibull distributed failure
probabilities, the maximum outage probability will occur when the fibers
are uniformly distributed to produce a region of constant exposure.
Consequently, although this type of fiber dispersion is extremely unlikely
in nature, the risk of power outage can be bounded by examining, as a function
of exposure level, the largest regions which can receive uniform exposures
of specified levels subsequent to a carbon fiber release. Figure 3.3
illustrates the _eometrv of this exposure scenario.
Under these conditions, if the fibers settle at a velocity vs and N
fibers are released, it follows that the ambient concentration, X, is
given by:
N
X = _ (3.2)
where h = height of fiber cloud
A = area exposed
Further, during a time t = h/Vs, all of the released fiber will
settle onto the ground. Thus, since exposure is the time integral of
concentration, the carbon fiber exposure experienced at any point in
the area A is given by:
N h N (3.3)
E = Xt = Ah • v Av
s s
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Alternatively, for the release of N fibers, the maximum area which
can experience exposure E is given by:
N . _
VsE _ _ (3.4)
This relation is used in the following analysi§ to provide upper
bounds on the risk to electric power distribution. The calculation has
the advantage of being independent of location-specific weather conditions.
Based on ADL's Phase I and Phase II Studies, we assumed the settling
velocity for carbon fibers to be 0.032 m/sec and the number of fibers
released to be 5 x 109 fibers/kg of released fiber mass. The minimum
exposure to produce a significant insulator failure probability is of the
order of 107 fiber-sec/m 3 and the data from the Phase I contouring
indicate that even exposures of 106 fiber-sec/m 3 are highly unlikely in
the absence of explosive agitation (see for example, Table 3.3).
Consequently, the following analysis considers only a combined fire and
explosion accident. In this case, the mass of released fiber will be
taken as 2.5% of the mass of carbon fiber on the aircraft based on NASA's
experimentally derived upper-bound estimates of carbon fiber release in
combined fire and explosion accidents.
It is also important to consider that in general, wind conditions
are not such as to transport the released fiber in the direction of the
power distribution system. Further, the cloud will generally travel
some distance before reaching the network, permitting some fraction of the
fiber to settle onto the ground before reaching the distribution system .
In order to accommodate the first factor, the distribution system has been
.2
assumed to be located at the edge of a i ml airport and the probability
of the cloud being transported towards the system is taken as the angular
20
fraction subtended by the distribution system. This implies a probability
of 0.15 that the cloud will move towards the system. As the fiber cloud
is being transported downwind toward the distribution system, many fibers
will settle onto the ground. This process may be modeled by adjusting N
in the above relation to replresent the number of fibers which are still
airborne upon reaching the distribution system. Standard relations for
calculating this depletion are available in the literature (see Slade,
1978) and under the assumption that the cloud travels at least one mile
before reaching the system, it follows that 60% of the released fiber will
have settled onto the ground. In the following calculations, N is reduced
by a factor of 0.6 to account for this settling.
3.4 RISK ANALYSIS
Based on the NASA/Westinghouse experimental work, estimates of in-
sulator failure probabilities as a function of carbon fiber exposure
have been developed. As described in Section 3.1, these probabilities are
characterized by a two-parameter cumulative Weibull distribution.
Under the assumption that the Weibull distribution holds over the
entire exposure range, it is recalled that the insulator failure
probability may be approximately expressed as follows:
PF (E) = i - e (3.5)
Where :
PF(E) = probability of insulator failure before exposure of level E
E = specified exposure level
e,B = Weibull parameters from Table 3.1
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If the failure of each insulatorexposed to a cloud of carbon fibers
is considered as a statistically independent event, the number of insul-
ators failing as the result of exposure of I insulators to a cloud of
carbon fiber may be considered as the result of I trials of a binomial
experiment with probability PF(E).
In order to estimate the number of insulatorsexposed, the contour
estimates developed in Section 3.2 are used along with an estimate of the
number of insulators enclosed in the exposed areas based on analysis of
the Bedford, MApower distribution system. To conservatively estimate
the risk, the largest density of insulators found in the system was used
to represent the entire area. This density was found to be 1.04 x 10-3
2
insulators/m . Assuming this uniform density of insulators and the re-
suits of Section 3.2, the number of insulators subjected to a given
exposure level may be written as:
FRE (5 x 109) DM
I = (3.6)
VE
s
where:
E = specified exposure level (fiber-sec/m 3)
I = maximum number of insulators exposed at this level
D = maximum number of insulators per square meter
Vs = carbon fiber setting velocity (0.032 m/s)
M = mass of carbon fiber on board aircraft
FRE = fraction of mass released as single fibers during a fire
and explosion accident
In applying this expression, it must be noted that I must be integer
valued since it represents the number of insulators contained within the
cloud. The amounts of carbon fiber mass on board aircraft were classified
according to the possible maximum integer values of I.
\
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In order to form an overall risk estimate for a specified exposure
level, it remains to attach probabilities to various numbers of insulator
failures using the above results along with accident probabilities and
parameters from the ADL Phase II report. These probabilities are summar-
ized in Table 3.4 and the estimated 1993 carbon fiber distribution within
the aircraft fleet is presented in Table 3.5. Using the above values,
the annual probability of experiencing x insulator failures due to car-
bon fiber exposure level E is given by:
I 3
_max Z E
P(x)
PA " NOp PD " PCF " eE " Pm __ __ F.l fi(Ml+l) -
I=i i=l
l n
f'l(Ml) (x) PF x (E) [i - PF(E) ln-x (3.9)
where :
f. (M) = the fraction of aircraft in size class i having lessi
than or equal to M kg of carbon fibers on board
\,
(Table 3.5).
Ima x = the largest number of insulators that can be exposed
(corresponding to largest mass of carbon fiber in any
aircraft).
MI = aircraft carbon fiber mass required to expose at most I
insulators.
P = probability of fiber cloud being blown toward them
distribution system (0.15).
Although this expression appears complex due to the large number of
variables, it simply expresses the probability of experiencing x insulator
failures as the product of the probability of an accident involving an
aircraft carrying a particular mass of carbon fiber with the probability
of x failures conditioned on the resulting fiber release and summed over
all possible masses of carbon fiber.
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TABLE 3.4
ASSUMED PROBABILITIES AND PARAMETERS FOR HAZARD CALCULATION
Description As'sumed value Symbol
Accident probability per aircraft operation 5 x 10-7 PA
Annual aircraft Operations at Logan International 3 x 105 Nop
Airport
Probability of total destruction during a crash 0.7 PD
Probability of combined fire and explosion 0.05 PE
subsequent to crash
Probability that an aircraft operation at 0.63 PCF
Logan Airport involves an aircraft carrying
carbon fiber
Fraction of Logan Airport flight operations 0.485 F1
involving large aircraft
Fraction of Logan Airport flight operation_ 0,415 F2
involving medium aircraft
Fraction of Logan Airport flight operations 0.I0 F3
involving small aircraft
Fraction of carbon fiber mass that is 0.025 FRE
released during a fire and explosion
accident
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TABLE 3.5
ASSUMED DISTRIBUTION OF CARBON FIBER
ON BOARD AIRCRAFT
Small Aircraft Medium Aircraft Large Aircraft
Percentage Mass (kg) Percentage Mass (kg) Percentage Mass (kg)
0 0 0 0 0 0
4 11.4 4 216.0 5 286.0
8 55.0 16 330.0 38 1283.0
54 139.0 24 351.0 44 2022.0
i00 183.0 26 567.0 50 3044.0
50 1492.0 63 4643_0
i00 3794.0 80 5179.0
99 6083.0
i00 15652.0
Source: Private Communication with Principal Airframe _nufacturers.
To assess the importance of these probabilities, criteria such as
outage severity and frequency of occurrence should be taken into account.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the impact of a particular insulator failure
can vary significantly with its location within the system. For the pre-
sent analysis, however, it is undesirable to introduce specific geometric
features into the calculation. In order to generalize the calculation_
it has been conservatively assumed that the insulator failures occur
randomly throughout the system (see section 2.3).
In order to evaluate the anticipated consequence of insulator failures,
some analysis of the distribution system is required. The details of this
analysis are described in Chapter 2 and are not repeated here, but the
basic result is that for an insulator selected at random, its failure will
imply failure of the entire system with probability 0.2, affecting 2400
customers,and that at most ii other circuits, each affecting approximately
i0 homes, will fail with probability 0.07. Assuming random selection of
insulators, it follows that the expected consequence of x insulator failures
is expressed by:
min (ii ,x)
C = (2400)[1 -0.8 X] + (0.8) x • i0 7_ n (_)(0.07) n (0.93) x-n (3.10)
n=l
In order to account for these estimates of consequence, the annual
probability of experiencing x failures was multiplied by the expected con-
sequence of x failures and summed to produce an annual expected number of
customers affected.
Due to the amount of computation required to evaluate these expressions,
a simple computer program was written to perform this calculation. Table 3.6
summarizes the resulting annual outage probabilities, meantime to failure
and expected number of customers affected for each of several exposure
levels. Figure 3.5 shows the annual outage probability
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TABLE 3.6
ESTIMATED RISKS DUE TO CARBON FIBER
EXPOSURE OF 15 kV PIN INSULATORS
Average
Exposure Level Annual Outage Annual Expected Number Mean Time Number of Customers
(Fs/m 3) Probability of Customers Affected Between Outages (yrs) Affected per Outage
5 x 107 2.5 x 10-4 0.22 4,000 880
5 x 108 4.4 x 10-4 0.75 2,300 1,700
5 x 108 2.8 x 10-4 0.25 3,600 890
7.5 x 108 2.3 x 10-4 0.16 4,300 690
1 x 109 1.9 x 10-4 0.ii 5,300 580
FIGURE3.5 - ANNUALOUTAGEPROBABILITYVERSESEXPOSURE
LEVEL FOR15kV POWERSYSTEM
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plotted as a function of exposure level and displays a clear peak in the
vicinity of 1 x 108 fiber-sec/m 3.
This peaking phenomenon represents the competing effects of contour
size and exposure level. Since high exposure levels generally imply small
exposure areas, the number of insulators exposed decreases for higher
exposure levels tending to decrease the probability of a power outage.
On the other hand, failure probability decreases rapidly with decressing
exposure so that low exposure levels are also unlikely to produce power
outages. The combination of these effects produces an exposure level
which causes the highest system failure probability.
It is then conservative to approximate the annual risk by the results
for an exposure of 1 x 108 fiber-sec/m 3 At this level the analysis
shows a mean time between outages of approximately 2300 years and an
average of 0.7 persons affected annually. (That is, once every 2300
years, .7 x 2300 or 1600 people are affected.) The system outage history,
however, indicates that typically there are annually at least 6 outages
affecting a total of about i000 people. The expected time between outages
thus increases by .007% (6 to 6.0004 per year) due to carbon fiber, and the
expected annual number of customers losing power increases by .07% (i000
to 1000.7). It is thus apparent that even based on conservative assump-
tions, there is negligible additional risk of power outage associated
with commercial aviation applications of carbon fiber composites.
At the voltages used for power distribution, the pole spacing and
hence the number of insulators is determined primarily by l_ouse spacing
and not from structural considerations. Thus, the number of insulators
per unit area will be essentially independent of system voltage and the
risks presented to a lower voltage (7.5 kV) system may be approximated
by performing the above calculation using the Weibull parameters for the
7.5 kV insulators. The results of tilecalculation are shown in Table 3.7
and Figure 3.6. This approach somewhat overestimates the consequences
of an outage, however, since a lower voltage system is likely to serve
fewer customers. The risks presented are, however, still inconsequential
compared to the prevailing rates of power outage.
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TABLE 3.7
ESTIMATED RISKS DUE TO CARBON FIBER
EXPOSURE OF 7.5 kV INSULATORS
Average
Exposure Level Annual Outage Annual Expected Number Mean Time Number of Customers
(Fs/m 3) Probability of Customers Affected Between Outages (yrs) Affected per Outage
5 x 107 2.2 x 10-4 0.17 4,500 770
i x 108 4.4 x 10-4 0.75 2,300 1,700
5 x 108 2.8 x 10-4 0.25 3,600 890
Oo
o 7.5 x 108 2.3 x 10-4 0.16 4,300 690
i x 109 1.9 x 10-4 0.ii 5,300 580
i:
FIGURE3.6 - ANNUALOUTAGEPROBABILITYVERSESEXPOSURE
LEVEL FOR7.5kV POWERSYSTEM
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3.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing analysis has utilized a number of conservative approx-
r
imations in order to bound the risk of power outages due to carbon fiber
exposure. The objective of these approximations has been not only to simpli-
fy the computational efforts but also to extend the general applicability
of the results by reducing the dependence on detailed properties of specific
distribution systems. When required, however, specific system properties
have been estimated based on a circuit selected with the advice of
Boston Edison as being representative of current design practices in
suburban power distribution.
Despite the conservative nature of the calculations, the above analy-
sis has predicted that in the worst scenario, the annual outage probability
will be 4 x 10-4 with an expected annual consequence of 0.7 customers
experiencing power failure. This implies a mean time between carbon fiber
induced outages of approximately 2300 years. Examination of historical
outage data for the circuit considered shows, however, that there are
generally at least 6 power outages per year and at least i000 people are
affected. In fact, considerably higher outage rates are not at all uncom-
mon. For example, Table 2.3 shows that there have been 3 failures of the
entire circuit (2400 customers) during the past three years alone. In
comparison to these data, the estimated outage rates due to carbon fiber
are negligible. It is interesting to note, however, that the expected
consequence of a carbon fiber induced outage is relatively large compared
to its outage rate. This reflects the fact that much of the system is
protected by the combination of a main system circuit breaker and a series
of lightning arrestors. The lightning arrestors provide considerable pro-
tection against complete system failure resulting from natural causes but
do not provide protection against carbon fibers. Thus, carbon fiber out-
ages are comparatively likely to result in complete failure of the distri-
bution system. Even this, however, does not appear to be cause for concern
because of the very long (2300 years) expected time between outages.
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The estimates developed above are believed to be quite representative
of the overall risks presented to electric power distribution by the use
of carbon fiber composites in commercial aviation. The justification for
this statement lies both in the fact that the calculations are fairly
independent of specific system properties and that the system selected
for analysis was chosen to reflect standard design practice. It is felt,
therefore, that the above analysis is sufficient to conclude that the use
of carbon fiber composites in commercial aviation poses a very small risk
to electric power distribution.
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3.6 SUMMARY OF UNCERTAINTIES
¢
It should be noted that the risk estimates are subject to uncer-
tainty from a number of different sources. Some of the principal
uncertainties are described below.
• Carbon fiber usage - the carbon fiber usage levels represent
projected 1993 levels based on information obtained from the
principal airframe manufacturers. It is possible that actual
usage will deviate from the assumed levels.
• Number of fibers by weight - this report assumes there are 5 x
109 single fibers per kilogram of carbon fiber available for
release based on previous NASA estimates. Although this
number may be much greater, this study also includes the con-
servative assumption that all carbon fiber composite mass is
exposed to the fire. This assumption compensates for the
possibility of release of larger numbers of fibers per unit mass.
• Fraction of carbon fiber released - Recent test results suggest
that the 2.5% figure used in the analysis is conservative.
• System vulnerability - vulnerability estimates were developed
for a particular power distribution system. Although there
are design variations among power systems, the network chosen
reflects standard design practice and the vulnerability estim-
ates were based on conservative assumptions.
In general, although there are a number of sources of uncertainty
in the assumed data, the analysis has followed a conservative approach
and still resulted in very small risks. It is felt that the inherent
conservatism of the analysis more than compensates for the possible
uncertainties.
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